The phenomenal economic growth in China has been accompanied by a rapid increase in income inequality. This paper reviews the historical trends and patterns of income inequality in China, discusses the potential causes underlying rising income inequality, and applies the functional distribution of income approach in understanding China's income inequality. This analytical approach highlights how rising return to capital relative to wage incomes can be an important source for increasing income inequality in China. The paper provides the evidence which shows that the rapid economic growth in China has been relying on a model that pays high returns to various kinds of capital including financial capital and real estate, while the ownership of capital is very unequal. This finding prompts us to rethink about the causes of China's income inequality and to formulate appropriate policies based on the new way of understanding this pressing issue of income distribution in China.
INTRODUCTION
China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world since the introduction of its reform policies in the late 1970s. Its per capita GDP has grown at an average rate of around 9 percent for almost three decades. However, this phenomenal economic growth has been accompanied by a rapid increase in income inequality. Although estimates of Gini coefficients vary substantially with respect to sources of data, geographic coverage of surveys and length of time periods, a general consensus from the existing studies is that China's income inequality has risen markedly since 1978 (as shown in Annex Table A1 ). As shown in The rapid increase in income inequality has put China among the most unequal countries in Asia and indeed the world. China is now one of the least equal 25 percent of countries worldwide, a group to which very few Asian countries belong (Sicular, 2014) (Annex Tables   2 and 3) . With a Gini coefficient approaching 0.5, China's level of income inequality is similar to that of several high-inequality Latin American countries (Sicular 2013) (Figure 2 ).
This shows that income inequality does become an economic, political and social problem for
China. The purposes of this paper are therefore to try to identify the fundamental causes for the rising income inequality in China in the process of economic transition through reviews of the key literature, and discuss some policy implications for confronting the challenge of narrowing income inequality for achieving more sustainable growth and social stability in China. 
CAUSES OF RISING INCOME INEQUALITY
Income inequality rises along with the increase in national income and may fall after a country reaches a certain level of income on per capita terms. This pattern of changes in inequality in relation to changes in income is commonly referred to as the inverted Kuznets U-curve (Kuznets 1955) . The Kuznets hypothesis implies that there is a causal relationship running from economic or income growth to income inequality. In other words, with the prospect of continuingly increasing national income associated with institutional and policy changes countries will eventually solve the problem of inequality. However, in reality, patterns of income inequality have been persistent for all kinds of countries both developing and developed ones. Potential causes for this phenomenon can be much complex involving factors such as differences in levels of development, the pattern of structural changes, both political and economic institutions, social norms and cultural factors and geography. It is even more so for China as the country is not only a developing country but also a transition economy. A transition economy emphasises economic incentives but lacks of market means for allocating resources, and the redistribution function for the government. In addition, there are various kinds of loopholes in its institutions in transition which are the causes for the socalled 'grey income' and rampant corruptions (Wang and Woo 2011) .
In this paper, we will discuss income inequality issues in China both by size distribution of income and by the functional distribution of income. The formal examines how the income shares of particular deciles change and whether Gini coefficients exhibit greater or lesser inequality over time; and the latter divides income according to its sources such as labour, land and capital, namely the division of national product between wages and profits (Fields, 1980) . Approaching income inequality by applying the functional distribution analysis has become more popular after the publication of Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Piketty (2014) .
As the data shows later on in this paper, the inequality of income distribution from the functional distribution has become one of the most important sources for the rising income inequality in China especially between returns to capital and wages.
A call for more equal distribution of income also raises an important question as to how equal the distribution system can be. A related conceptual issue is whether there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. In other words, whether achieving a goal of efficiency will lead to rising inequity; or whether dealing with inequality will compromise efficiency which in turn will affect governments' capacity for income redistribution. The formal is obvious from the Chinese experience, but the latter is not that straightforward in that there are social and ethical considerations involved apart from economic ones. There is much evidence which shows that over-emphasising income equality at the expenses of incentives and efficiency could compromise growth leading to the phenomenon of 'the middle income trap'. As Piketty quoted Charles Dunoyer (1845) as saying, "Reduce everything to equality and you will bring everything to a standstill" (p. 85). Finding a right balance between efficiency and equity is one of the most challenging tasks for China's economic reform and public policy at the present.
We now summarise those main sources of income inequality in China in turn.
The urban-rural income gap
The income gap between urban and rural households in China is one of the largest in the world. The share of the urban-rural income gap in total income inequality increased by 10 percentage points over the period 1995-2007, rising from 38 percent to 48 percent (Li and Zhao, 2011) . In other words, by 2007, according to official statistics, almost half of all inequality in China was due to the urban-rural income gap. Figure 3 shows the growing gap between urban and rural residents as recorded by official statistics. In the early 1980s, the urban-rural income gap contracted. In 1978, the Chinese government introduced a number of agricultural reform policies, including lifting agricultural prices and the replacement of collective farming by the household responsibility system.
These policies led to the subsequent rapid growth of rural residents' incomes. Between 1978
and 1983, the ratio of per capita net income 4 of rural households to per capita disposable income of urban households was reduced from 2.5 to 1.8, the lowest level over the past four decades. Since then the ratio has increased in most years and peaked out to 3.3 in 2006-2009, though it has fallen slightly in recent years.
The high urban-rural income gap naturally translates into differences in the ownership of durable goods such as washing machines, fridges and computers, all considered essential household goods in developed countries (Annex Table A4 ). The growing gap between urban and rural income is the result of very rapid growth in urban incomes. Between 2002 and 2007, for example, rural incomes grew at an average annual rate of more than 7 percent, but urban incomes grew at 11 percent (in constant prices) (Sicular 2013 ).
Industrial productivity is typically much higher than rural productivity because industrial sectors are increasing return activities. This explains why urban incomes are above rural in many countries. In China, constraints on migration limit the extent to which rural residents can move to urban areas in search of higher incomes and thereby reduce or close the urbanincome gap. China's household registration or hukou system registers every household as either rural or urban. There has been limited growth in urban hukou numbers. Households without urban hukou face low access to public services such as education and health care and, if they migrate, generally take lower-paying jobs. This restricts rural-urban migration.
Despite the progress of urbanization which saw urbanization ratio, defined as the ratio of urban population to the total population, rose from about 20 percent in the late 1970s to 54
per cent in 2015, various kinds of institutional and social barriers have still hampered the process of migration from rural to urban areas. Overcoming these barriers through institutional reform will ripe further gains in productivities for both rural and urban areas because of the 'resource shift effects' which are the impact of shifting resources from low productivity area to high productivity area. Source: National Bureau of Statistics China. Note: The urban-rural income ratio is calculated as the ratio between urban per capita disposable income and rural per capita net income.
The special arrangements governing Chinese land may also act as a constraint on migration.
In China, farm households only have land-use rights, not the right to sell their land. Farmers, if they decide to permanently leave agriculture, must give up their land to local authorities (Yang, 1999) . This increases the costs for farmers migrating to cities. Importantly, the slow progress in marketizing rural land including both arable land and rural residential land has left farmers with very thin asset base, which is in a sharp contrast to urban land which witnessed tremendous increases in values in reform period. This point will be echoed when we discuss later in the paper the functional distribution of income by which increases in return to capital are much higher than those for wages.
Despite these barriers, migration from rural to urban areas is extensive. The stock of ruralurban migrants increased rapidly from less than five million in 1978 to more than 250 million now, accounting for 15 percent of the total population. Most of these migrants are still registered as rural households (because they are registered as such), even though they live in urban areas. As argued by Xue and Gao (2012) , this means that China's urban-rural income gap, calculated using the official statistics, is overestimated. The official household surveys are based on urban and rural residence registration (hukou), and so exclude most rural-urban migrants (Knight, 2013) . Hence, incomes of rural migrants are included in neither the official rural nor urban household surveys (except to the extent that their remittances are reported by the receiving rural household). This distorts the measurement of the urban-rural income gap.
The study by Xue and Gao (2012) takes the provinces of Zhejiang and Shaanxi as examples and estimates that the urban-rural income gap is overestimated by 41 percent.
Even if the urban-rural income gap is overestimated, and whether or not it has been increasing, it would seem to be high by international standards. In any case, it is at best one part of the story of increasing inequality in China. Both rural and urban inequality show an upward trend since 1978 (Xue, 2012) . Other factors that might explain these increases are examined in the sections below.
Inequality and economic reform
From one perspective, it is hardly surprising that income inequality has grown in China. As reforms introduced since 1979 shifted China from a centrally planned system towards a market economy, a series of changes inevitably caused income inequality to rise. Wages started to better reflect the market demand for labor and value of education and skills. As opportunities arose, more enterprising or simply luckier individuals became entrepreneurs and made huge earnings as the economy was liberalized.
An example of the impact of reform on inequality is that the rural Gini coefficient increased from below 0.25 in the 1980s to above 0.30 in the mid-1990s. Rising rural inequality during this period was associated with the uneven development of rural township and village enterprises (TVEs) across regions and provinces, which itself was a result of the green light being given to the creation and growth of such enterprises in the 1980s.
Urban inequality has likely also been affected by economic reforms. A state-sector restructuring program was launched after the Chinese Communist Party's Congress in 1997
to shut down loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs), corporatize large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), restructure small SOEs, and de-link the provision of social services from
SOEs. The 1977 Congress also recognized private enterprises as an important component of the economy. Consequently, the urban labor market has experienced unprecedented growth in unemployment (40 million workers from the state-owned sector were laid off between 1996
and 2002) and reallocation of labor from the state sector to the private sector.
Economic reform in China is still incomplete and, as in any economy, some sectors are more competitive than others. One finding from the literature is that wage income in monopolistic industries is higher than in competitive industries in China. Yue, Li and Sicular (2011) divide sectors into those that are monopolistic (e.g. electricity) and those that are competitive (e.g. textiles). They find that this division accounts for 8.2 percent of the total income gap among workers, and that only differences in education are a more important source of inequality.
Education
China's human capital has experienced remarkable growth over the period of reform. The According to Li and Zhao (2011) , the returns to education have been increasing. Compared to those with lower levels of education (junior high school and below), graduates from senior high school, technical school and college earned 4 percent, 7 percent, and 14 percent more respectively in 1998. By 2009, these premia increased to 18 percent, 32 percent, and 61 percent, respectively (Meng et al., 2013 ).
An interesting perspective is to examine the extent to which wage premia are growing due to increasing returns to skills or, in fact, discrimination. Knight and Song (2007) found that the increase in wage premia was partly due to new and growing forms of discrimination. Knight and Yueh (2008) identified the ongoing importance of social connections in wage determination, despite strengthening of market forces. For example, rural-urban migrants lacking urban hukou could be treated as second-class citizens in cities and placed on an unequal footing in the job market. (Annex Table A5 presents the wage disparity between migrant workers and urban workers.) These migrants are less qualified, but Knight and Yueh (2008) argue that the difference in their expected wages is due not only to differences in qualifications, but also differences in connectedness.
There is a great disparity in the quantity and quality of education that urban and rural children receive. There is also a gap in the educational attainment of the children of migrant workers and the children of urban residents (Golley and Kong, 2013) . The transmission of education from one generation of a household to another is a powerful phenomenon in reform-era China and has become stronger in recent years. It tends to reproduce educational inequality, and thus income inequality, over the generations ).
Inequality of wealth
The empirical evidence around asset inequality is mixed. Ward (2013) Annex Table A6 presents more detail on the composition and growth of urban household income per capita from 1995 to 2007. Krever and Zhang (2011) report that, of all sources, property income has been the main factor causing the most unequal income distribution.
Regional inequality
The regional dimensions of inequality are significant in a country as large as China. China displays enormous spatial disparities in economic activities, natural resource endowments, local market institutions, local government policies and other determinants of income levels and economic growth (Zhang and Zou, 2012; Wei, 2007 According to Hao and Wei (2010) , income inequality between inland and coastal regions grew rapidly throughout the 1980s. They find that inland-coastal inequality accounted for more than 60 percent of income inequality across Chinese provinces in 2000, making it the largest contributor to China's intra-provincial inequality.
Studies suggest that the rise in regional inequality can be attributed to trade liberalization and Source: Sutherland and Yao (2011) Fiscal decentralization may have also increased regional inequality because, with reforms, provinces were forced to be more reliant on their own revenue sources. Coastal provinces tend to have a broader non-agricultural tax base, whereas governments in inland provinces have to tax their few industrial enterprises heavily to generate revenues. This leads inland regions to a vicious cycle of insufficient revenue and a heavier fiscal burden (Zhang, 2006; Hao and Wei, 2010) .
While many studies have found a considerable increase in China's regional income inequality since the beginning of the country's economic reforms, Li and Gibson (2013) point out that studies of regional income inequality have commonly ignored the fact that China's provincial GDP per capita data has been based on household registration (hukou) rather than residence.
If this issue is not properly taken into account, calculating provincial GDP per capita will be understated in migrant-sender provinces and overstated in migrant-receiver provinces, and this in turn will artificially inflate inter-province income inequality. With, as noted earlier, nearly 200 million rural migrants in urban areas without urban hukou, the accuracy of interprovincial income inequality computed from provincial GDP per capita is significantly reduced.
After carefully addressing this issue, Li and Gibson (2013) conclude that Chinese economic reform does not appear to have been associated with rising regional income inequality after all. Li and Gibson (2012) conclude that regional inequality in terms of GDP declined almost continuously during 1978 and 1990. About one-third of this decline was reversed over the next three years in the early 1990s. Regional inequality fluctuated thereafter and by 2010, the measure was back at the low levels previously seen in 1990 (Li and Gibson 2013) .
Thus the extent of any rise in regional inequality, and indeed whether there has been a significant increase at all, remains an open issue.
Corruption and grey income
Corruption is clearly a problem in China. The World Bank's Worldwide Governance
Indicators ranked China 148 th on "control of corruption" and 220 th on "voice and accountability" out of 235 countries in 2009 (Knight, 2013) . The prevalence of corruption likely influences both underlying inequality and measured inequality, since "grey income"
(for example, the collection by some officials of huge amounts of money at the weddings of their children and relatives) is likely to be both unequally distributed and underreported.
Based on the urban household income and expenditure data collected by their own surveys, 
Functional distribution of income: Evidence from China and the United States
The fundamental cause for the rising income inequality globally according to Piketty is that the return to capital has been persistently higher than the growth rate of the economy leading to an increasing share of capital and decreasing share of wages in national income. The functional distribution of income can also be found in China over the transition period. Figure   5 shows the factor payment shares for capital, high-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled labor in total national income in China. The data are drawn from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), which contains the socio-economic accounts for 40 major countries taking up around 80 percent of the global output value. In these accounts, data on hours worked by and compensation for three types of labour (high-skill, medium-skill and low-skill) and compensation for capital inputs and capital stock are reported. Since capital compensation is derived from gross value added minus labour compensation, capital compensation is thus the remuneration for all kinds of capital (such as R&D, software, database development, branding and organizational capital), mineral resources, land and financial capital (Timmer, ed., 2012). proposed by Piketty as an effective way of bringing its high income inequality down.
The figure also shows that the share for high-skilled labor even though relatively small in the total income is increasing over time. One implication is that human capital formation in terms of producing more high-skilled workers could be the only factor which increases its factor payment shares in total income balancing the rising of capital shares in total income. But at the same time, the rising share of high-skilled labor may itself be a source of rising income inequality as compared with the falling shares for both medium and low-skilled labor. This is indeed the case for the United States ( Figure 6 ) which shows that the factor shares for high-skill labor are steadily increasing along with the increase in capital shares while the income shares for medium-skilled continued to fall with low-skilled labor accounting for a very low share of income.
This may suggest that increasing human skills through education or training could be unambiguous in influencing income inequality. For example, the expansion of the shares of high-skilled labor in the United States didn't do much in reducing income inequality. On the contrary, it may help with raising the degree of income inequality there which has been getting worse (Stiglitz 2012) . For China, there may be a huge potential as compared with the United States to further increase its human capital formation which will be crucial for the task of economic rebalancing towards an innovative country. At the same time, there is need to explore further the link between human capital formation and income inequality. 
POLICY RESPONSES TO INCOME INEQUALITY
In the early stages of the economic reform process, inequality was not viewed as a problem, but rather, under the "let some people get rich first" policy, a necessary ingredient for success.
However, with incomes rising continuously (and indeed spectacularly) over time, the Chinese leadership has come to be less sanguine about rising inequality. More generally, the leadership has started to stress the goal of "harmony" or having a "harmonious" society.
Rising inequality is seen as a threat to the achievement of this goal, and a precursor to social instability.
In 2013, the Chinese government released its Income Distribution Plan, also known as the "35 Point Plan". The plan acknowledges that "the urban-rural gap and the difference in citizen's income is relatively large, income is irregularly distributed, there are obvious problems of grey income and illegal income, and some of the masses live in difficult conditions" (Salidjanova, 2013) . Its key measures include "boosting minimum wages to at least 40 percent of average salaries, loosening controls on lending and deposit rates, and increasing spending on education and affordable housing, … a requirement that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should contribute more of their profits to the effort of reducing inequality, and a commitment to push through market oriented interest rate reforms to give savers a better return and more security" (Salidjanova, 2013) .
This section presents a number of policy measures undertaken by the Chinese government, through the 35-point plan and other initiatives, to address income inequality.
Regional development policies
As discussed earlier, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government adopted preferential policies for the coastal regions, for example by establishing export processing zones along the coastal regions. This potentially increased income inequality between regions.
Since the late 1990s, Chinese leaders have been increasingly concerned that the poorer western region is being left behind. The Great Western Development (GWD) strategy 
Minimum wage policy and urban income inequality
Minimum wage regulations were first introduced in urban China in the late 1990s, but only started to be used actively to combat income inequality several years later. Today, the minimum wage is regarded as an important public policy tool to reduce poverty and income there is incomplete coverage and enforcement of minimum wage regulations, especially in the informal sector, which employs a large share of low-income workers (Ngok, 2008) .
Reforms to increase rural incomes
To raise rural incomes and alleviate rural-urban income inequality, the central government announced the decision to abolish the agricultural tax and prohibit the collection of fees by local governments in 2006. Annex Table A7 shows the changes in the burden of taxes 
Social welfare policies
A policy to alleviate both urban and rural income inequality is the minimum living standard program (dibao) (Annex Table A8 The implementation of dibao is a first step in the creation of a social safety net in China.
Reform of the taxation system
A progressive income taxation requires high-income people to pay a higher rate of tax than low-income people. China also needs to consider adopting and improving various kinds of capital tax in responding to the rising share of capital in total national income. This policy instrument becomes more pertinent given the evidence that the functional distribution of income has increasingly become a source of income inequality as identified in this paper.
With the introduction of market reforms, the government realized it would no longer be able to rely on state-sector wages to provide implicit taxation. China introduced an individual income taxation system in 1980. At the beginning, the threshold was set so high that virtually no one had to pay income taxes. China's income tax law has changed very little since its creation, but exemption thresholds have been reduced to make more of the population subject to income tax (Piketty and Qian, 2009 ). Piketty and Qian (2009) To what extent does personal income taxation affect income inequality? According to Knight (2013) , despite reforms direct taxation is still low and has little effect on urban income inequality in China. In 2008, personal income tax represented less than 0.01 percent of the household income of those in the lowest income decile, 0.12 percent in the sixth decile, and 2.1 percent in the highest decile. Knight (2013) suggests that other types of taxes could be adopted to deal with income inequality. For instance, property taxes could be used to adjust for inequality in income from assets.
Policies to improve the equality of education
China has made significant progress in the expansion of education. Average years of schooling increased from 6.79 years in 1996 to 8.28 years in 2008. Today, nine years of education is compulsory and virtually universal. A series of government policies have been adopted to promote equalization of education . For example, in order to help poor families overcome the financial barriers to access to compulsory education in rural areas, all fees for compulsory education in rural areas in western China were abolished in 2006. This policy was extended to central and eastern China in 2007. Despite these efforts, education inequality in terms of rural-urban divides, gender gaps, regional differentials, and social stratification has continued to be a serious social concern. Despite rapid education expansion, high-quality educational opportunities are still scarce in China. When income inequality is high, it could be difficult for poorer families to receive an adequate share of the available high-quality education resources. This can further aggravate income inequality, forming a vicious cycle (Knight et al. 2009 ). To address the issue, the Chinese government could increase public education expenditure to help achieve more equal distribution of education resources. Yet spending on education has been falling as a share of government expenditure ( Figure 7 ). 
Required institutional reform
Institutional reforms hold the key for addressing the balance between efficiency and equity as they provide the mechanisms by which the relative pay-offs for both government sector and the private sector are determined. Without these changes in institutions linking to incentives, the risks are high that public policies aimed at achieving more equitable distribution of income will compromise efficiency which is not conductive for the long-term development.
The onging anti-corruption campaign in China will no doubt help reducing wealth and income at top end which is conducive to improved income distribution, but it is also important to design and improve the system of incentives for both the government sector and private sector to boost the efficiency.
Institutional reforms need to be more comprehensive. As argued by Martinez-Bravo et al, (2012) , reforms in governance of both of the government and corporations, and the strengthening the rule of law and grassroots democracy will help with reducing income inequality. China is committed to further economic reform especially market-oriented reforms which will lower the entry barriers for private capital to engage with many key sectors of the economy such as the finance, telecommunications, railways and energy sectors which tend to pay much higher salaries than those firms in more competitive sectors. Various kinds of administrative powers will be reduced to enable markets to play a more significant role. As a result, fair competition can be upheld allowing all parties to compete in market places on an equal footing leading to a fairer wage structure in the economy. However, those who have vested interests and benefit from monopoly control may resist these policy shifts.
The deepening of market-oriented reforms has become the subject of heated debate as various groups attempt to influence policy directions (Duan and Saich 2014) .
Conclusions
It has become increasingly challenging for the Chinese government to tackle the issue of rising income inequality out of the economic, social and political considerations. Identifying those sources and causes of inequality is the first step for accomplishing the task which has been researched by many. For this purpose, the paper reviews some of the key findings in the literature with respect to the main sources of income inequality and discusses some policy implications for narrowing down income inequality in China. These policies include those on regional development, rural development, the social welfare system for low income people, taxation and education among others highlighting the roles of both institutional changes and policy adjustment.
A new contribution in this study is to provide some empirical evidence showing that the functional distribution of income has indeed become an important source for causing the rising income inequality in China. The rapid economic growth in China has been relying on a model that pays high returns to various kinds of capital including financial capital and real estate, while the ownership of capital is very unequal. This finding prompts us to rethink about the causes of China's income inequality and to formulate appropriate policies such as taxation on capital returns based on the new way of understanding this pressing issue of income distribution in China.
At the same time, policy designs have to take into account the consideration of the possible trade-off between efficiency and equity. The challenge is to maintain efficiency gains while reducing income inequality. This requires the combination of implementing appropriate public policies for addressing equity concerns with adopting further measures for deepening institutional reforms for achieving efficiency gains through improved incentives. Li and Sicular (2014) 
